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“In natural science, what is thought is built 
upon what is seen: but in economics, what is 
seen is built upon what is thought” (Shackle, 
1972, p.66)  
 
 
1. Introduction. 
When the history of economic theory in the 20th century is written, Shackle may emerge as 
an interpreter of what this theory was about in the first half of the century as well as the 
pioneer of what it was largely not about in the second half. While the interpretation of what 
occurred in the first half of the century is provided in Shackle’s book The Years of High 
Theory (1967), the contribution to the economics that largely failed to materialize in the 
second half is provided in his subsequent book Epistemics and Economics (1972). These books 
may be regarded as a summa of Shackle’s work on uncertainty and expectations ever since he 
started his studies in the 1930’s1. 
The stream of theory discussed by Shackle was launched in the 1920’s by Knight’s Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit (1921) and Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability (1921) and was 
extended in the 1930’s to the rising branch of macroeconomics and to “period analysis” as a 
crucial component of this branch. This extension was implemented by Myrdal’s Monetary 
Equilibrium (1939) and, through the controversies raised by Hayek’s Prices and Production 
(1931) and subsequent publications, by Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936) and by Hicks’s Value and Capital (1939, Part III and Part IV). 
The scope of this paper is to focus on the macroeconomic extension of this stream. The focus 
will be placed, within this extension, on the new view of time and the resulting theory of 
                                                 
* I wish to thank G. C. Harcourt, the participants to the 3rd STOREP European Summer School in Brixen for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 For an overview of Shackle’s life and publications, see Ford (1993) and Shackle (1983). 
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capital and interest that was developed in those years. The paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 focuses on Shackle’s account of the conflict between the new theories of the “Age 
of Turmoil” (the 1930’s) and the old theories of the “Age of Tranquillity”. In this section it 
will be argued that the conflict runs between two sets of theories so different from each other 
that they can be regarded as two Paradigms: the General Equilibrium Theories (GET 
Paradigm) and the Economics of Uncertainty and Expectations (EUE Paradigm). The 
replacement of the old Paradigm, it will be argued, amounts to the replacement of the general 
framework of “logical” (or no) time by the new framework of “historical” time. After 
Marshall, who was not unaware of the importance of this framework, it was Keynes who 
brought that replacement to completion. 
Section 3 investigates Shackle’s account of Myrdal’s ex ante/ex post distinction as a central 
product of the new Paradigm and as an indispensable tool for the macroeconomics of the new 
period. Shackle’s analytical insight and linguistic elegance are shown here to converge to 
highlight the flaws and limits of Keynes’s system of thought (the most advanced system of the 
Age of Turmoil) as well as of its degenerations into the “Keynesian hydraulics” of the 
following years. 
Section 4 deals with the replacement of the theory of interest, as developed in the Age of 
Tranquillity, by the theory of the money rate of interest, as developed in the new age. This 
section shows how this replacement goes hand-in-hand with a sophisticated development of 
the notion of money as a store of value (a crucial idea of the EUE Paradigm) and of the roles 
assigned to uncertainty and expectations in determining the equilibrium money rate of interest 
and its changes from period to period. 
Section 5 is an attempt to link the new theory of interest (more properly: of the money rate of 
interest) to the Austrian  theory of capital as re-deployed by Shackle. Here it is argued that 
Shackle’s re-deployment suffers from the same general limits of his own theory of interest (or 
account of it) as shown in Section 4, i.e. from his overemphasizing the neglect of historical 
time in the Austrian theory; a neglect that it was up to Hayek (as acknowledged by Shackle) to 
overcome. 
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks on the strengths and weaknesses of Shackle’s 
contribution to economics and the history of economic theory. It is argued that the strengths 
overwhelm the weaknesses and that current macroeconomics has failed to take advantage of 
these strengths. 
 
2. The conflict of Paradigms: GET vs. EUE 
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Isaiah Berlin’s dictum that “the fox knows many things, the hedgehog knows one big thing” 
is used by Shackle (1967, p.135) to identify the structure of Keynes’s “long struggle of escape 
from habitual modes of thought and expression”. According to Shackle, the “many things” of 
this escape are the particular notions and arguments (such as the postulates of classical 
economics or the three fundamental psychological factors of Keynes’s General Theory) that 
Keynes aimed respectively to eliminate from, or to introduce into, our “habitual modes of 
thought”. By contrast, Keynes’s “one big thing” is the acknowledgment of men’s inescapable 
ignorance of the future and its impact on the “nature of decision in general and therefore of the 
decision to invest” (1967, pp.135-6)  
What Shackle here calls “decision in general” and “decision to invest” can be investigated at 
the level either of an individual agent or, if one looks at the interaction between the decisions 
of all agents taken together, of the economy as a whole. Shackle pursued both lines of research 
(in his 1969 and 1979 books, for instance, he is concerned with the former line whereas in his 
1967 and 1972 books he is concerned with the latter). In both cases, however, the decision-
making that is investigated is decision-making in time2. However often the term time is used in 
Shackle’s work, it is never specified whether this is historical or logical time in J.Robinson’s 
sense (1962, 1974)3. Yet the time that lies at the roots of Shackle’s thought is unquestionably 
                                                 
2 The expression “in time” is here used in the sense of Hicks when he writes that “Menger’s theory is an 
economics in time but Bohm’s is an economics of time” (time being, in the latter case, “no more than a 
mathematical parameter” (1976, p.139). It is interesting to note that Hicks regards Menger’s own theory of 
liquidity as a clear indication of a theory in time (see below note 7) and therefore as a forerunner of Keynes’s 
“marginal efficiency of capital” and “liquidity preference”. These notions are indeed in time although, as Hicks 
argues in Shackle’s (unrecognized) footsteps (see below §3, bottom), “Keynes’s theory has one leg which is in 
time, but another which is not” (ibid., pp.139-40). Given Shackle’s two lines of research indicated above, Hicks’s 
insight may be extended to Shackle by arguing that both legs of Shackle’s theory are in time. On Shackle’s first 
line of research, see Lachmann (1990). 
3 Shackle does indeed distinguish between “time of mechanism” -or mechanical time- and “time of uncertainty” -
or expectational time- (to which he adds Marshallian evolutionary time) and ranks economic theories in terms of 
whether these are based on one or another of these notions (1965, Chapter VII; see also 1967). His “mechanical 
time” is much the same as J. Robinson’s “logical time” while his “expectational time” corresponds to the latter’s 
“historical time”. Since J. Robinson’s distinction has gained ground in economic literature (see, for instance, 
Vickers, 1994) while the term time is often used by Shackle without any adjectives, in this paper we will adopt 
J.Robinson’s wording. The scope of J.Robinson’s distinction has been summarized by Harris (2005) in the 
following terms (the “substitutability” and “specificity” mentioned in row 5 may be better rendered by the terms 
“homogeneity” and “heterogeneity”): 
 Logical Time Historical Time 
1.  Directionality of time  Reversibility  Irreversibility  
2.  Time intensity of action  Instantaneous  Discreteness, lags; inertia  
3.  Expectations  Self-realizing, correct 
foresight  
Falsifiable, future unknowable  
4. Information/Knowledge  Complete, free, symmetric  Imperfect, costly, local learning  
5.  Capital goods  Substitutability  Specificity, lumpiness  
6.  Investment  Elastic  Inertia, driven by animal spirits  
7.  Technical change  Disembodied  Embodied, path-dependent  
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historical time. It is this, not the other, sort of time which is a vehicle of Novelty and the source 
of Uncertainty. And it is this, not the other, sort of time which accounts for our ignorance of 
the future and our inability to manage it by the use of Reason. Hence the contrast between time 
and reason4. 
This contrast lies at the roots of the schism that gave rise to the economics of the ‘years of 
high theory’. It was in those years that economists turned away from the application of reason 
(the fountainhead of equilibrium economics) and focused instead on the complications entailed 
by (historical) time (the fountainhead of disequilibrium economics). These two approaches are 
so alien to each other that we can regard the resulting theories as corresponding to two 
different “Paradigms”. While the Paradigm that prevailed in the “Age of Tranquillity” was 
focused on logical time (or on no time at all) and culminated in General Equilibrium Theory 
(GET Paradigm), the Paradigm that prevailed in the “Age of Turmoil” was focused on 
historical time and culminated in what will be called in this paper the Economics of 
Uncertainty and Expectations (EUE Paradigm). The rise and fall of the GET Paradigm are 
brilliantly illustrated in Book II, The rise of the rational ideal, and Book III, The dissolution of 
the rational ideal, of Epistemics and Economics (1972). What is called in this book “rational 
ideal” is nothing but the GET Paradigm while what is called the “dissolution of the rational 
ideal” is nothing but the dissolution of this Paradigm. Shackle’s argument, however, is worded 
in such a manner that it is unclear whether this dissolution is an absolute event (in the sense 
that the GET Paradigm is an unfortunate episode in the history of our discipline) or only a 
relative event (in the sense that the GET Paradigm is rather a necessary episode in this 
history)5. If it is a relative event, Shackle’s “dissolution” should more properly be understood 
as a change in focus resulting from an advance in the intergenerational division of labour 
among economists. But, even in this sense, the term dissolution is partially justified for it was 
in the 1930’s that the main assumptions, methods, notions and purposes of the GET Paradigm 
were abandoned to the benefit of the alternative assumptions, methods, notions and purposes 
of the new Paradigm. These alternative features can be ranked and highlighted as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
8.  Money/Finance  Barter, passive money, 
complete futures markets  
Active money, liquidity preference, 
incomplete markets  
 
4 “Time is a denial of the omnipotence of reason. Time divides the entirety of things into that part about which we 
can reason, and that part about which we cannot. Yet the part about which we cannot reason has a bearing on the 
meaning of the part that is amenable to reason. Then analyst is obliged to practice, in effect, a denial of the nature 
of time. For he can reason only about what is in effect complete; and in a world where there is time, nothing is 
ever complete (1972, p.27; see also ibid., p.254). 
5 Shackle’s view of the relative importance of the two events is expounded in his introduction to Fossati (1957; 
also in Shackle, 1956). 
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GET PARADIGM: Logical (or no) time  Static Method  Reason  Perfect Knowledge 
(Foresight)  Partial Equilibrium  General Equilibrium. 
EUE PARADIGM: Historical time  Dynamic Method  Uncertainty  Ignorance 
(Unknowledge)  Expectations  Money Fluctuations. 
The contrast between the two Paradigms starts with Shackle’s argument that economics 
presents itself, according to the GET Paradigm, as the science of scarcity whereas it presents 
itself, according to the EUE Paradigm, as the science of uncertainty (1967, p.7 and p.146). 
This argument proceeds as follows: 
“Economic theory has asked two questions: How will things happen? What will things be like? 
The former leads to a study of diachronic forms, of a series of situations growing in some 
sense one out of another and thus composing a unity spread along the calendar. The latter leads 
to the construction of an exact, encompassing, timeless adjustment. Our purpose is now to 
consider this contrast of method and of the insight which the two methods seek. Both methods, 
in the nature of things, must study what is at some (one or more) moment. For existence is 
existence at a moment, the moment of existence is solitary and by itself. In the diachronic 
method, however, what exists is assumed to have, as a whole, such a character that it must 
transform itself into something different in the next moment. In the synchronic method, 
transformations have merely a potential existence as a background to throw into relief the 
adjustment which has been attained” (1972, p.89). 
 
The two questions above can be assimilated to the questions 1) as to how water runs from a 
hill into a lake (how will things happen?) and 2) as to how the same water disposes itself into 
the lake (what will things be like?). The static method is as necessary for answering the latter 
question as it is in closing the GET Paradigm with the notion of (partial or general) 
equilibrium: 
“Rational conduct is that which is demonstrably the most advantageous open to the individual 
in view of his circumstances. In order to demonstrate its superiority, even if he can do so only 
to himself, he must know what those circumstances are. Knowable circumstances can be those 
only of an immediate present. Situations and events removed into the future are not 
observable, and thus not knowable, for there is no proof of any rigid implication of the future 
by the past, and such an implication would contradict the notion of originative choice. Rational 
conduct is thus confined to a timeless or a momentary world. The circumstance which will 
affect the outcome of given conduct include the actions of other individuals. In order that each 
person may choose his conduct in effective knowledge of the contemporaneous choices of 
others, there must be pre-reconciliation of all choices by means of a declaration and pooling of 
conditional intentions” (1972, p.53)6. 
 
Since, however, knowledge changes “as soon as we permit time to elapse” (Lachmann, 1959, 
quoted by Shackle, 1972, title-page), it follows that the introduction of historical time implies 
                                                 
6 This timeless pre-reconciliation of choices is the general feature of the GET static method and, by derivation, of 
general and partial equilibrium models. But it is also implicit in the long-period assumption, however 
incompatible this might seem to be with the static method. 
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the abandonment of the assumption of perfect knowledge of other people’s -and even of our 
own- “conditional intentions”. Hence the dissolution of the GET Paradigm and the rise of the 
EUE Paradigm. Hence the emphasis of the EUE Paradigm on uncertainty and expectations as 
well as its reliance on period and process analysis7. 
Once uncertainty and expectations are introduced into the picture, money itself must be 
accommodated in a new guise. Prior to the years of high theory, money was usually regarded 
in economic analysis in its familiar aspects of unit of account (numéraire) and means of 
payment. Indeed, when economic theory was concerned in the classical period with the 
fundamental question of the nature and causes of the wealth of nations (the “Classical 
Paradigm”) or, over one century later, with the very different question of general equilibrium 
(the GET Paradigm), money could well be regarded as “a sort of mechanical device running at 
its own speed” (1972, p.12). But when the focus shifted to the EUE Paradigm (in which time is 
permitted to elapse and knowledge to change), money came to be regarded in its additional 
aspect of a store of value and, therefore, as a further link between uncertainty and economic 
behaviour (both at the individual and at the aggregate level)8: 
“Money, as something which can introduce a time interval between selling one thing and 
deciding what to have in exchange for it, can evidently have no place in a system whose logic 
requires all its choices to be comprehensively simultaneous in order that they may be pre-
reconciled and thus fully informed. Money is the means of stopping half-way in the complete 
transaction of exchange, the means of avoiding or postponing the hazardous and expectational 
choice of a concrete, specialized asset whose value is a conjecture about the relation of its 
design to future technology and markets. Liquidity is a denial of the rationality of the only 
economic world we have evolved” (1972, p.164)9. 
                                                 
7 For another review of the essential differences between the two Paradigms, see Shackle, 1965, Chapter VII. On 
the idea that “expectation and determinacy are incompatible and mutually exclusive” so that “the rational ideal 
must exclude expectation”, see Shackle, 1972, Chapter 16. The transition from “period” to “process” analysis is a 
further step in the development of the EUE Paradigm. As is well known, this transition was promoted by the 
Swedish economists of the 1930s and is particularly needed when the focus is on the macroeconomic 
consequences of any discrepancy between the ex ante and ex post magnitudes of a given period. On the 
importance of this transition in economic analysis when the economy moves from one structure of production to 
another, see Lachmann’s (Hayekian) treatment of malinvestment and the revision of plans (1978, pp.13-15 and 
Chapters II-III). 
8 The idea of money as a store of value was not unknown before the years of high theory. Menger, for instance, 
came to this notion first by focusing on the uncertainty resulting from our will to exchange, in conditions of 
division of labour, the goods that we offer for the goods offered by others but unknown to us in number, quality 
and exchangeability until we face them in the marketplace: hence the need for, and the rise of, money as the 
“ultra-liquid” good for which every other good is easily exchanged (1900 [1936], p.258ff). But he also focused on 
money as a device by which men can hedge against unforeseeable events and compensate for possible errors. It 
should be noted that the former kind of uncertainty relates to our ignorance of what is already there while the 
latter refers to our ignorance of what is not there yet. Shackle’s theory of money is concerned with the latter kind 
of uncertainty and is consistent only in this sense with the idea that “one must introduce uncertainty before one 
can introduce money” (Hicks, 1982, p.7). 
9 Once this idea of money was brought to the front stage of economic analysis, it was inevitable to adjust the 
whole theory of production accordingly. This adjustment was achieved by Keynes through his “monetary theory 
of production” which deals with a monetary (or entrepreneur) economy as distinct from a real-exchange (or 
neutral) economy (CW, XIII, pp.381ff and especially pp.408-11). 
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 Hence the question that lies at the roots of Keynes’s rejection of Say’s Law: in a system 
without money or, to be more precise, in a system where money is considered only as “a 
device running at its own speed”, does not Say’s Law hold true? Shackle’s answer runs as 
follows: 
“The answer which seems to me to impose itself is that money [“in its full nature”, 1967, p.93 
and below §3] absolves those who seek to accumulate wealth out of current production from 
necessarily themselves deciding what real form this wealth should take, placing the burden of 
this decision, and its consequences, on a few business men. It thus greatly multiplies, and 
offers extensive leverage to, the basic fact of ignorance of the future, and enables what might, 
in a barter system, be a large number of mostly unimportant discrepancies between the supply 
and demand of individual goods and the exertions and reward of individual persons to become 
a unified, measurable and very large gulf between what has been deemed worth producing in 
hope, and what, when market day comes at the end of a long period of speculative 
commitment of resources, actually proves to be exchangeable for money. Money enormously 
enlarges the hurtful power of uncertainty at the same time as it enormously facilitates the 
beneficent power of specialization” (1967, p.136-7)10. 
 
3. Ex ante vs. ex post  
The fact that individuals may hold at the same moment divergent or even opposite 
expectations of some future event should be distinguished from the fact that the expectations 
held by all the individuals who take similar decisions at the same moment (aggregate 
expectations) may be contradicted by the events that will emerge in the course of (historical) 
time after this moment is past. While the former fact mostly relates to the future behaviour of 
prices of particular goods or assets, the latter fact rather refers to the behaviour of 
macroeconomic flows such as output, consumption, saving and investment in the forthcoming 
period. Hence the importance of expectations for period analysis and the associated concept of 
macroeconomic equilibrium (which is an equilibrium in time). Hence the introduction of two 
new notions, i.e. first, the notion of the amounts that, at the threshold of the period, are 
intended (by entrepreneurs and income-receivers) to be formed during the period; and second, 
the notion of the amounts that, at the final date of the period, have been formed during the 
same period. Myrdal (1939) highlighted this difference by introducing the terms ex ante for the 
macro-variables considered in the first sense and ex post for the (same) macro-variables 
                                                 
10 The validity and limits of Say’s Law are also defended as follows: “Inequality of total demand and total supply, 
to be logically possible, requires the presence and the play of both ignorance and money. Ignorance, in the real 
world, there is indeed: ignorance of the future. And money is that institution which permits deferment of 
specialized, fully detailed choice” (1967, p.91). Hence the possibility of speculation as the “exploitation of 
ignorance” and the rationale of the interest rate as the price paid for compensating the uncertainty associated with 
lending money, i.e. for “parting with a known sum in exchange for an unknown sum” of money (1972, pp.12-3). 
See, however, below §5. 
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considered in the second sense. Shackle (1965, Chapter IV; 1967, Chapters 9-10; 1972, 
Chapter 37) most ably shows not only why this distinction is necessary in period analysis but 
also how it can be used to identify some flaws, and to fill some voids, in Keynes’s theory. 
Shackle’s account of the former aspect is also an attempt to justify the title of Myrdal’s 1939 
book: 
“In a model where money in its full nature (not merely in its role of unit of account) plays an 
essential role, the equality of total demand and total supply is a condition or special 
circumstance which is logically capable of  non-fulfilment. The monetary theory which 
Wicksell evolved from suggestions of Ricardo, and which Lindahl clarified and to which 
Myrdal gave the vital spark by his distinction of the two temporal viewpoints ex ante and ex 
post, and to which he gave a brilliant elegance and logical rigour, was devised with the very 
purpose of analysing the conditions of equality of total monetary demand and supply of the 
general output of goods of all sorts. It has also, of course, the purpose of studying the 
implications of non-fulfilment of these conditions” (1967, p.93). 
 
The fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these conditions are most likely to occur when it comes 
to the crucial relation between aggregate saving and aggregate investment. The link between 
this relation and the relation between aggregate demand and aggregate supply consists, to 
begin with, in the fact that both relations can be viewed either as accounting identities or as 
equilibrium conditions according to the following six relations (of which four are identities and 
two are equilibrium conditions) (1967, p.95): 
(i) Expected income is identically equal to value of intended production.  
(ii) Expected income is identically equal to intended consumption-spending plus intended 
saving.  
(iii) Value of intended production is identically equal to intended consumption-spending plus 
intended saving.  
(iv) Intended demand is identically equal to intended consumption-spending plus intended 
net investment.  
(v) Intended demand can be equal to value of intended production. 
(vi) Intended net investment can be equal to intended saving. 
Taken together, these relations indicate that intended demand (iv) may not be equal to value 
of intended production (iii) because intended net investment (vi) may not be equal to intended 
saving (vi), it being understood that any such inequality is usually brought about not by 
changes in intended saving but by the changes in intended net investment. These changes will 
result from shifts in the expectations concerning the “yield of planned investments” (in 
Myrdal’s terms), the “marginal efficiency of capital” (in Keynes’s terms) or the “rate of return 
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over cost” (in Fisher’s terms)11. When (vi) does not involve equality, the economy faces a 
macroeconomic disequilibrium: this outcome is as inescapable in an economy in time as much 
as its opposite is inescapable in the abstract economy of GET. 
Shackle’s discussion of the ex ante/ex post distinction, however, is extended to show that 
some of the “many things” to be found in Keynes’s thought are muddled by his failures to 
make use of this distinction. At the core of these failures is, according to this view, Keynes’s 
inability to use the concept of income as a forward-looking variable rather than, as implied by 
Keynes and many Keynesians, as the more familiar backward-looking notion concerning what 
has been earned in a given period. Hence Keynes’s vacillations between a process conception 
of the Multiplier -involving expectation and decisions- and the instantaneous conception by 
which consumption depends on realized income (in which case, Shackle argues, the 
mechanism would not work) rather than on expected income (in which case, Shackle argues, 
an increase in expected consumption should rather be understood as an increase in orders for 
supplies). Keynes’s neglect of the ex ante/ex post distinction, however, is particularly 
dangerous when he comes to the relation between aggregate saving and aggregate investment. 
Here his vacillations serve to conceal, rather than to highlight, the reason for their possible 
discrepancies. Thus, referring to chapter 7 of the General Theory where saving and investment 
are claimed to be necessarily and identically equal, Shackle argues: 
“The reader of that chapter will perceive that its reasoning refers to ex post quantities, and 
taking it by itself we therefore find it perfectly acceptable. But it leaves Keynes’s general 
position quite ambiguous. Does he believe that by proving this identity he is saying something 
about a coherence of intentions or wishes? If not, what is the mechanism by which a possible 
(and exceedingly likely) disagreement between total intended saving and total intended 
investment is corrected into an ex post equality?” (1967, p.148). 
 
Following Hawtrey’s insight on Keynes’s ambiguity on this issue12, Shackle argues that “it is 
the level of incomes which moves in search of an equilibrium between (designed, ex ante) 
saving and (designed, ex ante) investment” and that “when there is a disparity, a 
disequilibrium, between the two ex ante quantities, there will almost inevitably follow one 
period later, that is, so soon as this disparity is revealed ex post, a set of decisions by business 
men to change designed general output, and thus aggregate income” until the designed saving 
and investment of the next period are brought, if ever, to equality” (1967, pp.242-3). Thus 
                                                 
11 “The fulfilment of this condition is that state of intentions which constitutes monetary equilibrium, and this 
equilibrium, which might be more illuminatingly called equilibrium of general output and general demand, is 
nonetheless justifiably linked with the notion of money because only the presence of money in the full sense 
makes possible any divorce, in the aggregate, between production intentions and demand intentions” (ibid., p.95-
6).  
12  “If saving and investment are defined as ‘different aspects of the same thing’ how can it possibly be ‘the level 
of income which ensures equality between saving and investment’?” (Hawtrey, 1937, p.437). 
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Keynes’s ambiguity is said to descend from his tendency to telescope the moment of decisions 
and the moment of confrontation of the acts implied by decisions (i.e. the two ends of the 
Myrdallian interval, the ex ante and the ex post): 
“His constant reiteration that investment and saving cannot be unequal, but are brought to 
equality by changes of income, means that he defines income, not as the value-added which 
the business men imagine and look to when they sign contracts of factor employment relating 
to the coming interval, but as the value-added which they would assign to their production 
plans were they able, in some Wellsian time-machine, to move forward to the end of that 
interval and see what quantities, at what prices, will actually be sold, and then move back 
again to its beginning to note that when correct valuations are placed upon their production 
plans, saving and investment are equal” (1967, p.238).  
 
This insight implies that Keynes’s period analysis lacks a suitable equilibrium mechanism for 
supporting his equilibrium method13.  
 
4. Theory of interest vs. theory of (money) interest rate(s) 
The crucial role assigned to money as a store of value in the EUE Paradigm could not be 
without consequences for the theory of interest. Shackle’s views on interest are pursued at 
length both in the Years of High Theory and in Epistemics and Economics. They stem from 
Keynes’s view of interest as the “reward of not-hoarding” rather than as the “reward of not-
spending” (1936, ch.13) and must be regarded as an application of the more general theory of 
uncertainty and expectations. As is well known, Keynes’s view of interest is put forward in his 
liquidity-preference theory (1936, Chapters 13-17). This theory must be distinguished from 
what may be called, following the title of Cassel’s celebrated book, the nature-and-necessity 
theory of interest, the founding father of which is, as is also well known, Böhm-Bawerk. 
Keynes’s and Böhm-Bawerk’s theories of interest fall apart in two senses. First, because the 
object of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory is the nature of interest sub specie aeternitatis, i.e. regardless 
                                                 
13 The importance of the ex ante/ex post distinction is missed in most macroeconomic textbooks and literature. 
Blanchard (2000), for instance, underrates the role of this distinction and emphasizes Keynes’s “methodological 
contributions” to such an extent that he claims (contra, but without mentioning, Shackle’s interpretations) that 
“throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s the focus was increasingly on the role of the equality of saving and investment, 
but the semantic squabbles that dominated much of the debate (the distinction between ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’, 
‘planned’ and ‘realised’ saving and investment, the discussion of whether the equality of saving and investment 
was an identity or an equilibrium condition) reflected a deeper confusion. It was just not clear how shifts in saving 
and investment affected output” (pp.1378-9, where it is pointed out that this was made clear only in the General 
Theory). The implicit treatment or mistreatment and the eventual rejection of the ex ante/ex post distinction in 
Keynes’s theory deserves a proper study. For a starting point, see Kregel (1976) and Shackle himself (1965, 
Chapter IV; 1967, Chapters 9-10; 1972, Chapters 16 17, and pp.439-42). See also above footnote 7 and below 
footnote 17. For the argument that Keynes’s ambiguity on this issue was a matter of method rather than of words, 
see Shackle again (1967, pp.142-3; 1965, Chapter IV). On the links between desidered/undesired stocks, 
flexprice/fixprice models and stock/flow equilibrium, see in this connection Hicks (1974, Section II). The 
relevance of the ex ante/ex post distinction in modern macroeconomics is implied by the difference between the 
analytical concept of period and the historical concept of run highlighted by Harcourt (2006, p.62, n.6). 
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of whether interest is studied in the context of a money or a barter, a primitive or an advanced 
economy; and more generally regardless of whether the institutional setting of this economy is 
of one sort or of another. Second, because, whatever the economy and whatever its institutions, 
interest is studied by Böhm-Bawerk regardless of the factors that determine its size (the 
interest rate) and particularly the changes of this size from period to period14. Shackle’s 
account of the theory of interest, however, is such that he seems to regard Keynes’s and Böhm-
Bawerk’s theories as if they were both centred on the same phenomenon, i.e. on interest as 
such. But it should be noted that it is Böhm-Bawerk’s theory that is centred on interest as such 
while Keynes’s theory is rather concerned with the rate of interest and, more precisely, with 
the money rate of interest. Thus, while writing the story of this theory, Shackle exposes himself 
to the same risk faced while discussing the rise of the EUE Paradigm and the replacement of 
GET. This risk consists in believing that Keynes’s new theory replaces the old not only in the 
relative sense argued above but also in the absolute sense of falsifying the old theory. This risk 
is conveyed by Shackle’s (and Keynes’s) tendency to use the term “interest” interchangeably 
with the term “interest rate” and to deal with the latter as if there were no difference between 
the “interest rate” as such and the “money rate of interest”. Shackle claims, for instance, that 
“interest exists and is positive, because of the lender’s inescapable uncertainty. Its rate is 
determined in the bond market” (1967, p.203); and he points out elsewhere that “in a modern 
Western economy interest is mainly a manifestation, not of impatience nor of the higher 
technical productivity of roundabout methods, but of uncertainty” (1968, p.VIII). These views 
imply a refutation of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of interest and, particularly, of its “three causes” -
which hold under perfect foresight- to the benefit of the overall cause of uncertainty in an 
historic and institutional context15. Thus Shackle’s eventual admission that “the Austrian 
theory is not futile and unilluminating” (1972, Chapter 29, p.331) should be intended to apply 
to the Austrian theory of capital rather than to the Austrian theory of interest16.  
                                                 
14 The distinction between interest as such and the rate of interest was raised by Böhm-Bawerk against Fisher’s 
alleged confusion between the originating causes of interest and the determining causes of its rate (1889 [1959, 
Vol. III, Further Essay XII, p.183ff]). See also Hayek (1941, Chapter XXVI). 
15 While admitting that an income must be earned by the owners of the capital stock owing to their decisions to 
finance its creation in the past, Shackle continues: “Böhm-Bawerk called such income ‘interest’, but, as we have 
pointed out, he was not concerned with the idea of money in the full sense, and built a model which has no place 
for it. Thus the income which he called ‘interest’ would in Marshallian terms be called ‘quasi-rent’” (1965, 
p.160). But this implies a confusion between “interest” and “quasi-rent”; a confusion that is coherent, it should be 
added, with the confusion between “interest” and “money interest” discussed above. 
16 The idea that the theory of interest has been thoroughly re-written –rather than enlarged- by Keynes is implicitly 
denied in an initial passage of Keynes’s own exposition of this theory when he argues that “the mistake in the 
accepted theories of the rate of interest lies in their attempting to derive the rate of interest from the first of these 
two constituents of psychological time-preference [i.e. the propensity to save and the liquidity preference] to the 
neglect of the second; and it is this neglect which we must endeavour to repair” (1936, p.166; italics added). As an 
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Apart from these misunderstandings, Shackle’s account of what determines the rate of 
interest in a monetary economy is quite clear. The equilibrium money rate of interest is 
determined in the bond market (where bonds are exchanged for money and money for bonds). 
This rate brings about the equilibration of two flows and two stocks; i.e. the flows of net 
lending (the underwriting of bonds) and of net borrowing (the issuing of the same bonds), on 
the one hand, and the stocks of the bonds existing at a particular moment and of the bonds 
wanted by potential holders at this very moment, on the other. Thus the “enigma and dilemma” 
of interest-rate theory consists in determining how this twofold equilibration is reached. 
Indeed, while the flow mechanism calls for actual transactions between issuers and 
underwriters of bonds, the stock mechanism need not: here a change in expectations is enough 
to force the prices of existing bonds up or down and, accordingly, the interest rate down or up. 
Since, however, the quantity of old bonds in existence is in a modern economy 
overwhelmingly greater than the quantity of annual bond issues, uncertainty and expectations 
are more relevant in determining today’s interest-rate than any change in the relative strength 
of today’s lending (saving) and borrowing (investment). Finally, the link between changes in 
the stock equilibrium of the bond market and changes in the level of employment is brought 
out by Shackle as follows: 
“Suppose that the ‘stock’ mechanism, being dominant, has carried the rate of interest above the 
level which would have resulted from the ‘flow’ mechanism operating alone, and that at this 
high level the society’s desired saving flow exceeds its desired net investment flow. Since, ex 
post, these flows must by logical necessity be equal, we have to explain how it comes about 
that one or other or both of the realized flows differs from its corresponding intended flow. 
The first result of disparity may be that some goods, intended for immediate sale to consumers, 
will be left with their producers and constitute unintended investment. Later it seems likely, or 
inevitable, that production as a whole will be reduced. Out of the smaller income which 
measures this lower production, the society will desire to save less than it had formerly hoped 
to out of its former relatively large income. Too high an interest rate will have caused 
unemployment and a reduced general output, If the ‘flow’ mechanism is prevented (by the 
dominant ‘stock’ mechanism) from performing its task at a high level of general output and 
aggregate incomes it will compel the reduction of that output and income to a level where it 
can perform its task. Keynes’s theory of employment requires the supposition that the ‘stock’ 
mechanism is, or at least can be, dominant” (1967, p.208). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
indication of Keynes’s ambiguities and an implicit clue to the accusation that he eventually had “a college 
bursar’s theory of interest”, see his remarks on Marshall as someone whom he regards as responsible for what we 
can in turn regard as a reciprocal misunderstanding: “The perplexity which I find in Marshall’s account of the 
matter is fundamentally due, I think, to the incursion of the concept ‘interest’, which belongs to a monetary 
economy, into a treatise which takes no account of money. ‘Interest’ has really no business to turn up at all in 
Marshall’s Principles of Economics –it belongs to another branch of the subject” (1936, p.189; italics added). 
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This passage shows that the notion of money as a store of value, if properly combined with 
the notions of stock equilibrium in the bond market and of flow equilibrium in the saving-and-
investment markets, paves the way for connecting Keynes’s theory of the money rate of 
interest with his own theory of involuntary unemployment, on the one hand, and with Myrdal’s 
ex ante/ex post distinction, on the other. 
However brilliant and insightful, Shackle’s coordination of these streams of thought and of 
the evolution of Keynes’s liquidity-preference theory before and after 1936 (i.e. from what he 
calls the 1930 ‘first edition’ of Keynes’s theory in his Treatise on Money to the 1936 ‘second 
edition’ of the General Theory to the 1937 ‘third edition’ of the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics article to the never written ‘fourth edition’)17 does not go so far as to coordinate or 
contrast them, along with the debate on interest that took place in the 1937 issues of the 
Economic Journal18, with the contributions or extensions provided by two eminent scholars 
such as Hayek, on the one hand, and Hicks, on the other.  
Concerning Hayek, it should be noted that the problem of what determines, in a monetary 
economy, the price of “something to keep” versus the price of “something to sell, buy and use 
now or never” (Shackle, 1965, p.91) bears some resemblance to the problem (as set out, for 
instance, in Prices and Production) of what determines, in a real economy, the amounts and 
shapes of the capital goods existing at an instant of time (a stock equilibrium or disequilibrium 
in real terms) versus the amounts and shapes of the capital goods that are produced in a period 
of time (a flow equilibrium or disequilibrium in the same terms). And it should equally be 
added that the ex ante/ex post distinction may be used to address both problems though the 
role it plays in addressing the latter is more significant than in the former. Any discrepancy 
between ex ante saving and investment, for instance, may result in a change in the price of 
securities (and therefore in the money rate of interest) if it is related to the former problem. But 
it may also result in a change in the shapes of the capital goods produced (and more generally 
in the structure of production) if it is related to the latter. In the passage above, Shackle’s 
argument is focused on the former rather than on the latter problem. This is a strictly 
Keynesian argument and should be distinguished from Hayek’s structure-of-production 
argument which is focused instead on (inappropriate) changes in the production of capital 
                                                 
17 Shackle traces the never written “fourth edition” of Keynes’s liquidity-preference theory to Keynes’s promise to 
deal in “a future article which I intend to write” with “the relation of the ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ analysis in its 
entirety to the analysis in my General Theory” (1967, p.227). 
18 The debate was launched by Ohlin in the March issue and continued until the publication of Keynes’s 
concluding article in the December issue. The rise of the debate may be traced to Keynes’s (and partly to Ohlin’s) 
inability to understand that “Myrdal had not invented a new analysis, he had pointed out the true nature of the 
existing one” (Shackle, 1967, p.228). 
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goods resulting from an increase in the stock of money (forced saving) rather than from an 
increase in aggregate demand resulting from an initial change in aggregate investment 
(whether due to a shift in the marginal efficiency of capital or in the money rate of interest)19.  
 
Concerning Hicks, Shackle does indeed ascribe to this author the merit of identifying the 
“starting-point” of the “theory of interest” (more properly: of the money rate of interest) with 
the Keynesian question about what makes people willing to hold some of their wealth in barren 
money rather than in interest- or profit-yielding assets (1967, pp.226-7). Yet he fails to take 
into account Hicks’ own elaborations on this “starting point” in Value and Capital (1939). The 
structure of this book epitomizes the great change that took place in economic theory during 
the 1930’s, i.e. the transition from the static method of GET (Part I and Part II) to the dynamic 
method that underlines the theory of expectations and fluctuations (Part III and IV). Thus 
Hicks’s own analytical constructs (such as the ‘week’, temporary and intertemporal 
equilibrium, elasticity of expectations, plans and their coordination, spot and forward interest 
rates)- are not examined by Shackle in conjunction with the other “inventions” of those years. 
It is ironic to note that he could have found in Hicks’s work a development both of the positive 
and of the negative aspects of Keynes’s theory20. This development should be located in 
chapters IX-X and XI-XIII of Value and Capital if only because the latter group of chapters 
deal with the theory of money rates of interest, chapter XI being wrongly titled -à la Shackle- 
“Interest” rather than –as would be more appropriate- “The Term Structure of Interest Rates”).  
 
5. Capital and Time 
A place where Shackle comes closest to the notions of logical and historical time is when he 
deals with the “paradoxical contrast” between the timeless system and the long period 
conception (both of which “treat time with disdain” although the former excludes it altogether 
through the pre-reconciliation of choices while the latter introduces it into the picture but only 
                                                 
19 On the impact of discrepancies between (voluntary) saving and investment on the shapes of capital goods, see 
Lachmann’s treatment of changes in his “capital structure” resulting from changes in expectations (1978). It 
should also be noted that, when he comes to an explicit treatment of (time in) the theory of capital (more on this 
below in section 5), Shackle shifts his focus from the Keynesian (financial-market) approach to the money rate of 
interest towards a remake of Bohm-Bawerk’s old and static theory of capital (not, in any case, towards a remake 
of the latter’s theory of interest as such) rather than of Hayek’s dynamic version of the old theory. See, however, 
Shackle’s own and brief treatment of the composition and direction of what he calls the “capital complex” 
(another expression for Lachmann’s capital structure) in his 1972 book, Chapter 29, §29.2 and §29.11. 
20 It is interesting to note that Hicks himself came up to this task later when he admitted that his 1939 book had 
built “a kind of a bridge, but, as I now see very well, it was a very imperfect bridge, not so very unlike the 
imperfect bridge that had been built by Keynes. My theory also was divided; there was a part that was in time and 
a part that was not. But we did not divide in the same place” (1976, p.141). 
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through the oscillations consequent on an initial shock) (1967, p.127); and later on when, in 
Book IV, The rejection of time, and Book V, Diachronism: the artefact of time, of Epistemics 
and Economics, it becomes clear that it is historical (not logical) time that is rejected by the 
GET Paradigm whereas it is logical (not historical) time that is the artefact of “diachronism”, 
the method adopted in Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of capital.  
Diachronism is a method for dealing with logical time when time is not considered as 
confined to the present or solitary moment (in which all the pre-reconciled choices of GET are 
made) but is rather extended to the succession of moments into which the unlimited calendar-
axis can be divided. Time in this sense is a sort of space with succession and should be 
distinguished from a sequence of periods, the kernel of process analysis, where changes in 
knowledge, expectations and errors are more properly involved. Time intended in the first 
sense is what underlies the economics of time while time intended in the second sense is what 
underlies the economics in time. But, when he comes to the role assigned to the passage of 
time in the Austrian theory, Shackle fails to coordinate the analysis of time as an ingredient (in 
modifying intertemporal values or the volume of output, as for instance in Böhm-Bawerk’s 
theory) and the analysis of time as a container of events (Meacci, 1994)21. Hence Shackle’s 
ambiguities on the “powers and limitations” (1972, p.306) of the Austrian (Böhm-Bawerk’s) 
theory. For, on the one hand, he notes that “capital requires, and rewards, deferment of the 
fruits of effort” (ibid., p.304) (this is indeed the foundation of that Austrian theory of interest 
that Shackle fails, as we argued above, to keep apart from the Keynesian theory of the money 
rate of interest) and that “the more nearly the economic society is confined to a hand-to-mouth 
existence, the more nearly, in principle, can its operations approach the rational” (ibid., 
p.157)22; while, on the other hand, he parts company with Böhm-Bawerk when he starts with a 
definition of capital à la Fisher as a set of capital-values and with a definition of income à la 
Lindahl as an appreciation of these capital-values (ibid., pp.66-7). He eventually supports 
Lindahl’s definition if only because this belongs to the context of historical time and concludes 
that the theory of capital built on this notion “goes to the heart of things” whereas Böhm-
Bawerk’s theory is based on the assumption of the stationary state where knowledge and 
                                                 
21 On this ambiguity, see Shackle’s notions of “time as room for something”, “time inseparable from tool using” 
and “time as the field of expectation”, in  Shackle, 1972, pp.284-5, pp.268-9 and p.266. On Shackle’s account of 
how Marshall faced this ambiguity, see ibid., p.289ff.  
22 “For when the goods dealt in on the markets are perishable and ephemeral, they must be changed at once and 
therefore find a price  at once, and there will be no considerations bearing on that price except the immediate 
needs, tastes and momentary endowments of the members of a society. Prices in such a society must be formed; 
they can be formed because they are properly based on definite and simple data. It is the introduction of ‘wealth’, 
of assets which promise and represent permanence or persistence, that must destroy the basis of rationality” (1967, 
p.157). On the role of (short-term) expectations in “processes which occupy time”, see Keynes (1936, p.46). 
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foresight are assumed to be perfect, events can be “both sequential and co-existent” and 
processes of change are excluded (ibid. pp-316-7; 329-331). 
Yet it remains to be seen whether the theory that “goes to the heart of things” should be the 
expectational theory of capital advocated by Shackle or, rather, Böhm-Bawerk’s diachronic 
theory. It can indeed be argued that Shackle’s view of the “heart of things” might as well be 
reversed to the benefit of the old Austrian approach. For diachronic and expectational theories 
are to each other as men’s capacity to stand is to their capacity to walk or run: as it belongs to 
the natural course of things that we should first learn to stand and then to walk or run, likewise 
the Austrian theory of capital should be expected to come first while it is an idle question to 
wonder whether this theory is inferior to the theory that came later. Shackle’s difficulty in 
recognizing what was to come first and what was to come later in the history of capital theory 
(let alone of economic theory at large) proves by itself the validity of Marshall’s statement that 
“the element of time is the centre of the chief difficulty of almost every economic problem” as 
well as the vain boldness of Marshall’s “relentless effort to bring into one fabric of argument 
the two incompatibles” (i.e. the different problems relating to logical and historical time) 
(Shackle, 1972, p.286).  
It should be recalled, however, that the Austrian theory comes in two instalments and that the 
second instalment, which was designed to overcome the limits of the first, is due mostly to 
Mises and Hayek. Hayek, in particular, was the one who took the static core of the theory of 
capital out of the stationary state and placed it into the context of historical time (to which 
fluctuations belong). Hence the coalescence of the (Austrian) theory of capital into “the great 
macro-economic river” where it “became enmeshed with the theory of money” and contributed 
to forming the new theory of business cycles (Shackle,1981). The second instalment is best 
understood if one starts from Shackle’s division of theories into Theories of Natural Success 
(GET Paradigm) and Theories of Capability of Error (EUE Paradigm) (1972, Chapter 30). 
This instalment belongs to the latter group of theories in spite of Hayek’s 1928 article on 
intertemporal equilibrium and the resulting neglect of expectations in Hayek’s early work on 
fluctuations. For, concerning intertemporal equilibrium, it can be argued that it is this 
equilibrium that is upset by fluctuations (so that the latter are best understood if one starts from 
an economy where they cannot occur) and, concerning expectations, it can equally be argued 
that their disappointment is what is dealt with implicitly in Hayek’s 1931 book (and explicitly 
in later publications). Although in the Years of High Theory Shackle does not reserve to 
Hayek’s contributions the detailed attention reserved to Keynes’s, in his 1981 article he pays 
due tribute to Hayek’s insights on the ex ante/ex post discrepancies and on the 
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coordination/miscoordination of plans in “competitive” -as distinct from “simple”- economies 
when time is an essential ingredient of production (Hayek, 1941, Chapter II, Part II and Part 
III)23. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
What Skackle writes of Hayek (“clear and incisive in thought; the embodied principle itself 
of following the logic where it leads: the soul of scholarly generosity”: 1981, p.234) may apply 
to Shackle himself. Indeed, the attribute of “scholarly generosity” fits Shackle more properly 
than Hayek. What cannot apply to Shackle is his praise of Hayek as “one of the outstanding 
sculptors of this age’s thought”. But it remains to be seen whether this is Shackle’s fault. The 
mainstream of “this age’s thought” has indeed turned most of its back to Shackle’s own 
sculpture. This can be noticed in a number of fields for a number of reasons. One of these is 
Shackle’s generosity towards both Keynes and Hayek for, as Shackle admits, he “received the 
‘sealed orders’ of his career” in the former’s Treatise on Money and in the latter’s Prices and 
Production (Shackle, 1983, p.108) (but it was implied above that the former’s ‘sealed orders’ 
are stronger than the latter’s). Another was the rise of “hydraulic” or “bastard Keynesianism” 
and the “Keynesian” policies pursued by most governments in its wake. Still another was the 
direction taken by the theory of expectations in the last decades of the 20th century with its 
emphasis on rationality and equilibrium even in economies immersed in historical time. 
Finally, and perhaps more important than anything else, was the rise in the second half of the 
20th century of an approach by which the GET Paradigm –either in its old or in its newly 
forged versions- came to be regarded as “a kind of umbrella general enough as to be able to 
cover all economic theories, including also Keynes’s” (Pasinetti, 2005, p.211, n.3). This 
tendency, it must be noted, should in turn be distinguished from, and –due to its own 
misunderstandings of the different scopes of different paradigms- should rather be regarded as 
worse than, the idea of an “absolute” replacement of the GET by the EUE Paradigm 
occasionally implied (and occasionally denied) in Shackle’s works. 
                                                 
23 Though entirely devoted to Hayek’s contributions, Shackle’s 1981 article fails to bring out the continuity lying 
behind their convoluted developments between the 1928 article on intertemporal equilibrium (which can be 
regarded as a situation where expectations are always fulfilled) and the publications of the following decade 
(which deal instead with situations in which this fulfilment does not occur). This continuity is implicitly defended 
in The Pure Theory of Capital (where, for instance, it is argued that “the statement of the conditions under which 
individual plans will be compatible is implicitly a statement of what will happen if they are not compatible”, p.23) 
and has been recognized by Graziani (1996). It should finally be noted that in his 1981 article, Shackle also fails 
to bring out the common interest shared by both Hayek and Keynes, his two conflicting mentors, for the role of 
expectations. On expectations as an “opportunity” missed by the Austrians, see however Lachmann (1976). 
 17
Not that Shackle’s thought is without contradictions. We have warned above against some of 
the arguments, and especially some of the words, by which Shackle’s view of the history of 
economic theory in the 20th century is put forward. We have first highlighted his ambiguous 
treatment of the replacement of the GET Paradigm by the EUE Paradigm and we have rejected 
his view of Keynes’s theory of the money rate of interest as an “absolute” substitute for Böhm-
Bawerk’s theory of interest. But the sharpness and elegance by which Shackle goes to the 
heart of the EUE Paradigm and of Keynes’s “monetary theory of production” are such as to 
provide the reader with the key for grasping on his/her own not only the huge differences but 
also the distant compatibilities between the two Paradigms. Both these differences and 
compatibilities descend, it was argued above, from the two different foundations -logical (or 
no) time in one case, historical time in the other- on which the two Paradigms stand.  
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